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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with a serious question that is largely unaddressed by the
U.S. or international legal systems:  how should society deal with inherently,
catastrophically dangerous information—information that, in the wrong hands,
could lead to the destruction of a city, a continent, or, conceivably, the entire
planet?  Such information includes, but is not limited to, blueprints for nuclear
weapons, as well as specific formulae for chemical and biological weapons of
mass destruction.
The paper is not a critique of the existing statutes and regulations that
various governments use to keep their secrets secret.  Rather, it is a discussion
of what to do when some such secrets are inevitably disclosed, or, more
generally, how to deal with catastrophically dangerous information that is
generated outside of governmental control.
Addressing these issues is primarily a matter of policy, but policy with
significant constitutional dimensions.  Perhaps the most fundamental of those
dimensions is the question of whether a governmental restriction on receipt,
dissemination, and even mere possession of information can be reconciled
with the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment.  Although existing
authorities do not directly address the subject, what little authority there is
suggests that reasonable restrictions upon the possession and dissemination
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of catastrophically dangerous information—even when that information is
already within the public domain—can be implemented in a way that is
consistent with the First Amendment.
Given the growing urgency of the subject and the need for a
comprehensive approach, I advocate a statutory solution in the United States
that defines and limits access to catastrophically dangerous information, but
which also limits governmental seizures and restrictions to only the most
dangerous types of information, and which provides for a pre-seizure warrant
requirement and expedited post-seizure judicial review.  Given the global
dimensions of the problem, I also advocate a corresponding international
regime patterned upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.
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1. THE FLAMING LIPS, The Yeah Yeah Yeah Song . . . (With All Your Power), on AT WAR WITH THE
MYSTICS (Warner Bros. Records 2006).
2. See, e.g., Coerced Testimony in Plan:  A U.S. Proposal to Try Terror Suspects Includes Use
of Hearsay and Withholding Evidence, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 3, 2006, at A8; Clifford Krauss, Evidence
Grows That Canada Aided in Having Terrorism Suspects Interrogated in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2005, at A7; Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A1 (discussing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754 (E.D. Mich. 2006)).
If you could blow up the world with the flick of a switch
Would you do it?
Yeah yeah yeah yeah, yeah yeah yeah yeah1
I.  INTRODUCTION
In this article, I propose placing statutory and treaty restrictions upon the
possession and dissemination of what I refer to as “catastrophically dangerous
information”—information that, in the wrong hands, could lead to the
destruction of a city, a continent, or, conceivably, the entire planet.  Such
information includes, but is not limited to, blueprints for nuclear weapons as
well as specific formulae for chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction.  I propose that possession and dissemination of such information
should be restricted even if that information has been released into—or
generated in—the public domain.
Such a proposal is not likely to be popular among law professors or civil
libertarians, especially in an era when we are treated to what seem like daily
revelations of outrageous and unconstitutional conduct by the Executive
Branch.   Indeed, my proposal raises the specter of Bradburian book burnings,2
jackboots in public libraries, and Orwellian thought police.  It also, of course,
raises fundamental First Amendment issues.
Such concerns are valid; I share them.  But I believe that my proposal is
compatible with the First Amendment and with the protection of civil liberties
generally.  In contrast, I think that American society’s current de facto
policy—doing almost nothing about catastrophically dangerous
information—poses a far greater threat not only to our basic constitutional
rights, but also, not incidentally, to the continued existence of human life
itself.  Accordingly, I begin this article with a detailed discussion of that
threat.
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3. Seth Shostak, Space.com, Our Galaxy Should Be Teeming with Civilizations, but Where Are
They?, http://www.space.com/searchforlife/shostak_paradox_011024.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
4. The Milky Way is, of course, only one of billions of galaxies in the observable universe.
5. Terrestrial civilization is only a few thousand years old, and is already on the verge of sending
its first probe, Voyager 1, beyond the solar system.  Voyager 1 is now in a region called the “heliosheath”
that marks the edge of interstellar space.  Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Voyager 1:  ‘The Spacecraft that
Could’ Hits New Milestone, Aug. 15, 2006, http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).  NASA
estimates that Voyager 1 “could cross into interstellar space within the next 10 years.”  Id.  Voyager 2 is
not far behind.  Id.
6. Paul Rincon, Stars Reveal the Milky Way’s Age, BBC NEWS, Aug. 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3573914.stm.
7. Space.com, The Drake Equation to Estimate Intelligent Extraterrestrial Life,
http://www.space.com/searchforlife/seti_drake_equation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
II.  THE END OF THE WORLD?
A.  Fermi’s Paradox and the Drake Equation
In 1950, the nuclear physicist and Nobel Laureate Enrico Fermi, in what
was apparently a casual lunchtime discussion, reportedly posed a question that
has since haunted the scientific community:  if intelligent life exists elsewhere
in the universe, then where is it?3
Implicit in Fermi’s question is the calculation that if intelligent life exists
in only a small proportion of the billions of solar systems in the Milky Way
galaxy,  and has only existed for a small proportion of the age of that galaxy,4
then any extraterrestrial neighbors of ours should have made their presence
known to us long ago.  This may seem counterintuitive, but consider:  any
civilization that has existed for only a few million years could develop
interstellar travel,  and, given a few million years more, could easily colonize5
most of the galaxy.  A few million years may seem like a very long time, but,
compared to the roughly 13.6-billion-year age of the Milky Way,  it is but a6
blink of the galactic eye.  So the question that is now known as the Fermi
Paradox remains:  given billions of stars, billions of planets and billions of
years—where is everybody?  If intelligent, extraterrestrial beings exist, then
why haven’t we found them, or they us?
In 1961, Frank Drake, a young astronomer at the National Radio
Astronomy Observatory in West Virginia, came up with an idea that suggested
at least one possible answer.  He constructed a simple multivariable equation
that quantifies the probability of detecting intelligent extraterrestrial life in our
home galaxy.  It is now generally known as the Drake Equation:7
* p e l i cN = R  • f  • n  • f  • f  • f  • L
where
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8. SETI Institute, Statement of Purpose, http://www.seti.org (follow “About Us” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 10, 2007).
9. SETI Institute, Institute History, http://www.seti.org (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow
“Institute History” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
N = The number of civilizations in the Milky Way Galaxy whose
electromagnetic emissions are detectable.  In other words, the
number of intelligent civilizations which might be detectable
through radio signals or similar means;
*R  = The rate of formation of stars suitable for the development of
intelligent life;
pf  = The fraction of those stars with planetary systems;
en  = The number of planets, per solar system, with an environment
suitable for life;
lf  = The fraction of suitable planets on which life actually appears;
if  = The fraction of life-bearing planets on which intelligent life evolves;
cf  = The fraction of civilizations that develop technologies that release
detectable signs of their existence into space;
L = The length of time such civilizations release detectable signals into
space.
Thus, according to the Drake Equation, the number of detectable
extraterrestrial civilizations—N—varies directly with the value of the
remaining variables.  In other words, the more stars that form, the more
planets that orbit those stars, the more of those orbiting planets that are
habitable, etc., the greater the chance that we can detect intelligent,
extraterrestrial life in our galaxy.  While the Drake Equation offers no
definitive answer—N, of course, depends upon the inputs, most of which are
still unknown—it does provide an analytical framework for estimating the
probability of discovering extraterrestrial intelligence.
Drake is now a Professor Emeritus of Astronomy and Astrophysics at the
University of California Observatories.  He also serves as the Director for the
Carl Sagan Center for the Study of Life in the Universe at the Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) Institute.   Although it may seem easy to8
dismiss any organization with the initials “ET” in its name as the province of
cranks obsessed with finding little green men, SETI is actually a well-
respected scientific research organization that has administered more than
$150 million of funded research since its founding in 1984, and boasts two
Nobel Prize winners on its Board of Trustees.9
Moreover, the relevance of SETI’s mission has been underscored over the
last two decades with the discovery of the first planets outside of our own
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10. See Dan Vergano, A New Hope:  Astronomers Reach 200-Exoplanet Milestone, USA TODAY,
July 24, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/columnist/vergano/2006-07-24planet-milestone_
x.htm.  This does not mean that astronomers have directly observed all of these planets.  Rather, for the
most part, they have deduced the existence of the planets through a variety of indirect observations, such
as precise measurement of the gravitational effect of those planets upon the stars they orbit.  A star orbited
by one or more planets appears to “wobble” as those planets orbit the star.  Laurence R. Doyle, Space.com,
Detecting Other Worlds:  The Wobble Method, http://www.space.com/searchforlife/seti_wobble_
method_010523.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).  This “wobble” can be detected by astronomers who
measure the changes in the light emitted by the star, which shifts between blue and red as the star moves
toward or away from Earth.  Id.  See Exoplanets.org, Capabilities of Various Planet Detection Methods,
http://exoplanets.org/othermethframe.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).  This is an example of the same
Doppler Effect that changes the perceived pitch of a train whistle as it approaches or moves away from an
observer.  Doyle, supra.  Recently, however, astronomers claim to have actually observed and photographed
an extrasolar planet for the first time.  See Robert Roy Britt, Astronomers Capture Photo of Extrasolar
Planet, CNN.COM, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/space/04/01/extrasolar.planet.photo/.
11. Indeed, much, perhaps most, of what we know about the cosmos has been discovered in only
the last few decades.  See Verlyn Klinkenborg, On the Recentness of What We Know, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2006.
12. Origins:  Where Are the Aliens? (PBS television broadcast Sept. 28 & 29, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3113_origins.html.
13. Id.
14. It may not be coincidental that electromagnetic emissions, in the form of radio waves, were first
solar system.  Until the 1990’s, notwithstanding decades of speculation in
science fiction stories and Hollywood movies, no one could be certain that
extrasolar planets existed.  As of July, 2006, however, two hundred extrasolar
planets had been discovered.   These discoveries are only part of a recent10
explosion in our knowledge of the universe in general terms.   Indeed,11
Dr. Drake now believes that there is enough hard data to fill in enough
variables in his famous equation to estimate that N = 10,000.  That is, Drake
believes that 10,000 detectable technological civilizations may exist in our
galaxy alone.12
But Drake may be too optimistic.  He and his colleagues have been
systematically searching the heavens now for decades, and still have not found
a trace of another civilization.  This result may be because, as Drake insists,
the heavens are a big place, and we have searched only a tiny part of them so
far.   Or, it may be that Drake’s calculations or assumptions are flawed.  For13
example, he may be assigning too great a value to the last variable in the
equation, which is the one that concerns us here:  L, which represents the
average length of time that a technologically advanced civilization might
release detectable signals into space.  Although there are many reasons why
L may be low, one obvious reason is that an advanced, technical civilization
capable of producing electromagnetic emissions will soon use its technical
knowledge, intentionally or inadvertently, to destroy itself.   If this is the14
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widely produced on our planet at roughly the same time as atomic fission; both appeared early in the 20th
Century.  The two technologies require similar levels of scientific and engineering knowledge.  If a
comparable pattern exists in other technological civilizations, then the means of our detection of those
civilizations (emissions) appear at the same moment, historically speaking, as the means of those
civilizations’s self-destruction.  So L may, in fact, be exceedingly low, perhaps less than 100 years.
15. Craig S. Smith, Atomic Agency and Chief Win the Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at
A1.
16. The precise effect of a nuclear explosion is, of course, subject to many variables, including the
topography of the target, the altitude of the device upon detonation, and the force of the explosion itself.
See generally Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator, http://www.fas.org
(follow “Nuclear Weapons” hyperlink; then follow “Bomb-A-City Calculator” hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 10, 2007).
case, then the Drake Equation solves Fermi’s Paradox:  no one from an
advanced extraterrestrial civilization has contacted us because they are all
dead.
An empty universe, littered with the remains of countless ruined societies,
presents a chilling prospect.  Its implications for human civilization are dire.
If, in fact, L is a low number, representing the relatively short time that a
technical civilization can exist before destroying itself, then humanity is living
on borrowed time.  Unfortunately, many purely terrestrial reasons exist for
believing that this is so.  Indeed, one might say that our particular doomsday
clock started ticking over half a century ago on a desolate mesa in the
American Southwest.
B.  Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. ElBaradei
In October, 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was, along with the IAEA itself,
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for combating the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.   The award was well-deserved, for there are few, if any, issues15
more important to the establishment and maintenance of international peace
than the limitation, and, if possible, the elimination of these terrible devices.
The sobering facts are familiar, yet they bear review and emphasis.  A
single nuclear explosive, detonated in a densely populated city, can, in less
than one second, kill millions of people and destroy property worth billions
of dollars.   The intense flash of light produced by such a detonation can16
blind observers miles away, and the resulting cloud of dust and debris can
spread massive amounts of lethal radioactivity for hundreds of miles.  The
ultimate effects of detonating thousands of these devices simultaneously, as
might occur in a full-scale nuclear exchange between the U.S. and Russia, are
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17. See generally CONG. OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
WAR (1979), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (follow “Jump to Letter:
E” hyperlink; then follow “The Effects of Nuclear War” hyperlink).
18. Id. at 109-12.
19. Id. at 112-15.
20. Id.
21. F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT:  MAKING THE ATOMIC BOMB
48 (1999), available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/publications/DE99001330.pdf [hereinafter
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT].
22. KAI BIRD & MARTIN J. SHERWIN, AMERICAN PROMETHEUS:  THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER 309 (2005).  Oppenheimer reportedly quoted Vishnu aloud, but such reports are
apparently mistaken.  Id.
23. On the other hand, the possibility of a limited nuclear strike was never foreclosed.  Only weeks
incalculable.  At the very least, hundreds of millions of people would die
immediately, while millions more would die in the aftermath.   Millions more17
would suffer the long-term effects of radiation poisoning, including genetic
damage.   Beyond the direct effect on the human populations, the effect on18
the Earth’s environment is unknown, although there is informed speculation
that significant damage to the ozone layer, as well as genetic mutations in
plants and animals would occur.   These environmental effects would19
compound the damage done to any survivors.   Thus, it is no overstatement20
to say that Dr. ElBaradei and his colleagues are literally attempting to save the
world.
Doing so is an increasingly difficult challenge.  Indeed, it is remarkable
that humanity has managed to avoid self-annihilation in the six decades since
the United States detonated the first nuclear explosive at the Trinity test site
in Alamogordo, New Mexico in July of 1945.   Upon witnessing that first21
successful test, Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who oversaw the U.S.
nuclear weapons development effort, code-named “Manhattan,” recalled the
words of the Hindu god Vishnu from the Bhagavad-Gita:  “I am become
Death, Destroyer of Worlds.”22
Oppenheimer spent the rest of his unhappy life wrestling with the
knowledge that he had played a crucial role in developing what soon would
become a doomsday device.  However, most of the inhabitants of our
particular world took a little longer to recognize the momentousness of the
Trinity test.  This lack of knowledge is understandable, both because of the
revolutionary—and previously secret—nature of the technology in question,
and also because that technology remained under the control of only two
nations, Great Britain and the United States, for the first several years of the
nuclear age.  Consequently, the immediate chance of global catastrophe was
relatively slight.23
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after the Trinity test, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, bringing the Second World
War to a rapid and decisive conclusion.  See THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, supra note 21, at 51-54.  There
is an important historical lesson here for those who dismiss the very idea of nuclear conflict as
“unthinkable.”  They would do well to remember that the United States has already waged, and won, a
nuclear war.  This lesson has not been overlooked by subsequent American Presidents, who have thought
very hard about whether to use nuclear weapons again.  See, e.g., Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen,
U.S. Nuclear Threats:  Then and Now, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 69-71
(George W. Bush, Nixon, Eisenhower, and Truman); Associated Press, Nixon Considered Using Nukes in
Vietnam, ABC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2259840 (Nixon).
24. BIRD & SHERWIN, supra note 22, at 285-87; TERRENCE R. FEHNER & F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, ORIGINS OF THE NEVADA TEST SITE 42 (2000), available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/
me70/manhattan/publications/DOENevadaTestSite.pdf.
25. Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Soviet Nuclear Testing:  August 29, 1949-October 24,
1990, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 1998, at 69, 69-71.
26. BIRD & SHERWIN, supra note 22, at 416-30.
27. A word about nomenclature is in order.  What we commonly refer to as “nuclear weapons” come
in many varieties and go by several different names.  Early nuclear explosives, and some smaller weapons
in the current U.S. arsenal, are commonly called “atomic bombs” or, more properly, fission weapons.  These
weapons generate explosive force through nuclear fission, which involves “splitting” the nuclei of heavy,
unstable elements such as plutonium or uranium-235.  See Nuclear Fission and Nuclear Fusion,
http://xenon.che.ilstu.edu/genchemhelphomepage/topicreview/bp/ch23/fission.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2007).  In contrast, “super” nuclear weapons are fusion weapons which generate energy through the
combination, or fusion, of lighter elements.  See id.  See also Michael Lennick, “We Knew that if We
Succeeded, We Could at One Blow Destroy a City”:  A Final Interview with the Most Controversial Father
of the Atomic Age, Edward Teller, AM. HERITAGE MAG., June/July 2005, available at
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/3/2005_3_54.shtml.  These fusion weapons
make up the bulk of the modern arsenals of both the United States and Russia.  Because fusion can only
take place at extremely high temperatures (such as exist in the interior of stars), these super atomic weapons
are often called “thermonuclear” weapons.  In order to generate the temperatures necessary for fusion,
thermonuclear weapons use the less-powerful fission weapons as triggers.  U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLDWIDE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR:  SOME PERSPECTIVES n.2 (1996),
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext96/nukwr10.txt (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) [hereinafter
WORLDWIDE EFFECTS].
28. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:
The most widely used standard for measuring the power of nuclear weapons is “yield,”
expressed as the quantity of chemical explosive (TNT) that would produce the same energy
Inevitably, however, the nuclear monopoly enjoyed by the Anglo-
Americans was short lived.  On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union, aided by
the efforts of its spies at the Manhattan Project,  detonated its own first24
atomic weapon at the Semipalatinsk test site in what is now the independent
nation of Kazakhstan.   The race for nuclear supremacy then began in earnest.25
In November, 1952, over Oppenheimer’s objections,  the United States26
successfully tested its first “super” nuclear device, which would be developed
into the so-called hydrogen bomb.   A hydrogen bomb can generate explosive27
force thousands of times greater than the weapons detonated over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.   Nine months later, in August of 1953, the Soviet Union28
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release.  The first atomic weapon which leveled Hiroshima in 1945, had a yield of 13 kilotons;
that is, the explosive power of 13,000 tons of TNT.  (The largest conventional bomb dropped
in World War II contained about 10 tons of TNT.)
Since Hiroshima, the yields or explosive power of nuclear weapons have vastly increased.
The world’s largest nuclear detonation, set off in 1962 by the Soviet Union, had a yield of 58
megatons—equivalent to 58 million tons of TNT.  A modern ballistic missile may carry warhead
yields up to 20 or more megatons.
WORLDWIDE EFFECTS, supra note 27, at n.1.
29. Despite billions of dollars and several decades of research, comprehensive ballistic missile
defense remains little more than Ronald Reagan’s dream.  See Michelle Ciarrocca, Missile Defense,
FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, May 2003, available at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol8/v8n01missile.html;
Michelle Ciarrocca, Missile Defense All Over Again, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Oct. 2004, available at
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol9/v9n04missdef.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).  While some local missile
defense systems, such as the much-touted Patriot missile, can occasionally hit their targets, none have
reached 100% effectiveness.  See 60 Minutes:  The Patriot Flawed? (CBS television broadcast July 27,
2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/19/60minutes/main601241.shtml (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007).  Indeed, the United States Missile Defense Agency has a rather modest stated mission of
“moving forward to provide a limited defensive capability against a long-range ballistic missile attack
aimed at any of our 50 states.”  U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, A DAY IN THE LIFE OF THE BMDS [BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM], available at http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007) (emphasis added).
30. There are, of course, several other ways to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets, including
the use of manned bombers, cruise missiles (which fly at low altitudes, like aircraft, as opposed to following
high, ballistic trajectories), and submarines (which may launch either ballistic or cruise missiles).  See
generally Center for Defense Information, Current World Nuclear Arsenals, http://www.cdi.org/
nuclear/database/nukestab.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) [hereinafter World Arsenals].  Given the
increasing miniaturization allowed by technology, there seems to be no end to the possible methods of
delivering nuclear weapons to their targets.  Indeed, as early as the 1950’s and 60’s, the United States
deployed atomic cannons, which could shoot so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons for distances of up to
twenty miles.  See GlobalSecurity.org, M65 Atomic Cannon, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/ground/m65.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
followed suit.  Both countries then embarked upon aggressive testing
programs, which resulted in the development of ever more powerful and
compact thermonuclear weapons.  Soon, these weapons were small enough to
be carried as the payloads of newly-developed missiles, which traveled at
supersonic speeds along high, ballistic trajectories, making any defense almost
impossible.   The most powerful of these missiles could deliver nuclear29
weapons over intercontinental distances, and were therefore dubbed Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBM’s.   The time from such a missile’s30
launch in say, Siberia, to an impact in say, Washington, D.C., was less than
one hour.  With the advent of large arsenals of thermonuclear weapons
mounted on ICBM’s, humankind had, by about 1960, truly attained the power
of Vishnu.
In early October of 1962, that power was almost unleashed.  Over thirteen
fateful days, the future of the world hung in the balance as U.S. President John
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31. On July 16, 1973, Alexander Butterfield, an aide to President Richard M. Nixon, famously
revealed the existence of a secret, voice-activated tape recording system at the White House, leading to
Nixon’s near-impeachment and resignation a year later.  See Lawrence Meyer, President Taped Talks,
Phone Calls, WASH. POST, July 17, 1973, at A1.  Far less famously, on July 17, 1973, President Kennedy’s
presidential library revealed the existence of secret tapes made during JFK’s presidency, some of which
covered meetings of the Executive Committee of the U.S. National Security Council during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.  See SHELDON M. STERN, THE WEEK THE WORLD STOOD STILL:  INSIDE THE SECRET CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 1 (2005).
32. STERN, supra note 31, at 31, 32, 34.
F. Kennedy faced off with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev over the
deployment of medium-range Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.  As tape
recordings  of the top-secret meetings of the Executive Committee31
(ExComm) of the U.S. National Security Council demonstrate, several of
President Kennedy’s advisers advocated aggressive military responses to this
perceived provocation, including air strikes, invasion and even, in the case of
Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “the possible use
of nuclear weapons”   against the Soviet missile sites in Cuba, which were32
just then becoming operational.  This was true despite the fact that everyone
in the room recognized the likelihood of a massive Soviet military response
if, as noted by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, several hundred
Soviet soldiers and technicians were killed in a U.S. attack:
McGeorge Bundy,
National Security Advisor: Killed?
McNamara: Killed.  Absolutely!  We’re using napalm, 750-pound
bombs.  This is an extensive strike we’re talking about.
Bundy: Well, I hope it is!
C. Douglas Dillon,
Secretary of the Treasury: I think they’ll take Berlin.
George W. Ball,
Under Secretary of State: [We should provide a twenty-four hour warning, to give]
Khrushchev some way out.  Even though it may be
illusory, I think we still have to do it.
John F. Kennedy, President
of the United States: [Khrushchev will] grab Berlin anyway.
McNamara: [O]nce you start down that course, it’s possible that
Khrushchev outmaneuvers you.
JFK: [The European allies will think that we lost Berlin because
of missiles in Cuba] which, as I say, do not bother them.
Robert F. Kennedy
Attorney General: I think he moves into Berlin.
McNamara: What do we mean exactly?  Do they take it with Soviet
troops?
JFK: That’s what I would see, anyway.
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33. Id. at 58-59 (quotations adapted) (emphases in original).
34. Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro (Oct. 30, 1962), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/35_kennedy/psources/ps_defendcuba.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2007).  Some of the Soviet missiles could have struck targets as far away as San Francisco, according to
a Department of Defense display board.  See STERN, supra note 31, at 35-37.
35. Id.
36. See STERN, supra note 31, at 195.  Before leaving this most terrifying episode in the Cold War,
I must note one truly remarkable aspect of the Cuban Missile Crisis that is often overlooked:  The
deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba did little, if anything, to alter the strategic balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union.  As noted in the ExComm tapes:
Bundy questioned whether the missiles were militarily significant:  “How gravely does this
change,” he rapped the table for emphasis, “the strategic balance?”  McNamara boldly distanced
himself from the Chiefs under his authority:  “Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon.  In
effect, they said ‘substantially.’  My own personal view is, not at all.”
Id. at 47.  As noted, the U.S. already had nuclear missiles stationed along the southern border of the USSR
in Turkey.  The Cuban deployments provided a roughly equivalent striking ability to the Soviet Union.  One
can argue that such deployments were destabilizing, because both the Turkish and Cuban missiles would
give very little warning time before reaching their targets.  Again, however, the threats were equivalent.
McNamara: I think there’s a real possibility of that.  We have U.S.
troops there.  What do they do?
Taylor: They fight.
JFK: And they get overrun.
RFK: Then what do we do?
Taylor: Go to general war, assuming we have time for it.
JFK: You mean nuclear exchange?
Taylor: Guess you have to.33
Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed.  An aggressive U.S. military reaction
would almost certainly have prompted a global conflict.  Indeed, the Cubans,
at least, were quite ready for a showdown.  On October 27, 1962, Cuban
President Fidel Castro sent a cable to Premier Khrushchev indicating Castro’s
belief that an American attack was imminent.   According to a later account34
in a letter from Khrushchev to Castro, the cable also contained a chilling
proposal:
In your cable of October 27 you proposed that we be the first to carry out a nuclear
strike against the enemy’s territory.  Naturally you understand where that would lead us.
It would not be a simple strike, but the start of a thermonuclear world war.
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I find your proposal to be wrong, even though I
understand your reasons.35
The conflict ended when Kennedy publicly pledged that he would not attack
Cuba and secretly offered to withdraw obsolescent Jupiter medium-range
ballistic missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet
missiles from Cuba.  Fortunately, Khrushchev agreed.36
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Moreover, by 1962, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were operating submarines equipped with ballistic nuclear
missiles which could be stationed near to each other’s coastlines.  See Federation of American Scientists,
629 Golf, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/629.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007); Federation of
American Scientists, Polaris A1, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/a-1.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2007).  The ExComm, and presumably, its Soviet counterpart, were fully aware of this fact, and discussed
its significance.  See STERN, supra note 31, at 156.  Submarine-launched ballistic missiles were, and
remain, just as destabilizing as the ground-based missiles deployed in Cuba and Turkey, perhaps even more
so, given the difficulty of detecting ballistic missile submarines.  But despite the fact that the Soviet
missiles in Cuba were militarily insignificant, there were people on both sides of the Cuban Missile Crisis
who were apparently quite willing to use them as a reason to destroy the entire world.
37. This situation has been notably monitored via the notorious “Doomsday Clock” maintained in
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:
Since its inception in 1947, the Doomsday Clock has signified the level of threat posed by
nuclear weapons and other changing factors in international security . . . . As the state of
international security has changed, the Doomsday Clock has been moved 18 times to reflect the
danger level of the period . . . . The Doomsday Clock was last moved on February 27, 2002 and
currently stands at seven minutes to midnight.
See Bull. of the Atomic Scientists, Doomsday Clock, http://www.thebulletin.org/doomsday_clock/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2006).
38. Geoffrey Forden, Reducing a Common Danger:  Improving Russia’s Early-Warning System,
POL’Y ANALYSIS, May 3, 2001, at 1, 3-7, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa399.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007).
The Cuban Missile Crisis is only the most infamous episode of Cold War
nuclear brinkmanship.  Over the next several decades, the world teetered
alternately away from, and closer to, the nuclear abyss on several occasions.37
On November 9, 1979, U.S. nuclear forces were put on launch alert when the
U.S. early warning system indicated that a massive Soviet nuclear attack was
underway.  Air defense fighters were launched, along with the president’s
airborne “doomsday” command center.  It was a false alarm, prompted by a
realistic training tape that had mistakenly been inserted into the early warning
system’s computers.  Less than a year later, on June 3, 1980, the early warning
system again erroneously indicated a Soviet nuclear attack; this time, a faulty
computer chip was to blame.  On September 26, 1983, a new Soviet early-
warning system mistook the rising sun as the launch of several hundred
American missiles, with near-fatal consequences.  On January 25, 1995,
Russian defense officials thought that a Norwegian sounding rocket was an
attacking American missile.  As the Russian military forces prepared to launch
a counterstrike, Russian President Boris Yeltsin went so far as to activate his
emergency nuclear warfare communications system before the error was
finally discovered.  These are the publicly known dates upon which human
civilization almost ended.   In all likelihood, several more—perhaps many38
more—such episodes remain classified and therefore unknown to the world
at large.
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39. See Walter Gibbs, Accepting Nobel, ElBaradei Urges a Rethinking of Nuclear Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 1, at 9.  The Center for Defense Information estimates the total number at
approximately 21,844, including the arsenals of the U.S. Russia, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and
Great Britain.  See World Arsenals, supra note 30.
40. “[B]oth the United States and Russia maintain and regularly exercise a capability to launch on
warning thousands of nuclear warheads after a missile attack is detected but before the incoming warheads
arrive.  The United States could launch approximately 2,700 strategic warheads within minutes; Russia
2,100.”  THE NUCLEAR TURNING POINT:  A BLUEPRINT FOR DEEP CUTS AND DE-ALERTING OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 3 (Harold A. Feiveson ed., 1999).
41. Or maybe not.  Despite recent gains by relatively liberal groups in Ukraine, other former Soviet
republics, such as Belarus, remain firmly in the grasp of authoritarian regimes.  Russia, under its former-
KGB President Vladimir Putin, seems to be sinking back into political repression.  See Freedom House,
2006 Country Report:  Russia, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=
2006&country=7044 (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
42. See Forden, supra note 38, at 12-13.
43. This decreased security has created a significant risk of diversion of highly-enriched fissile
materials:
Russian radioactive materials are all too vulnerable, in reprocessing facilities, abandoned
weapons, research labs:  1,500 tons of uranium, 150 tons of plutonium, enough to build some
300,000 nuclear bombs.  Some of it is poorly secured, and some still virtually unsecured,
waiting to be stolen and sold on the black market.
MARTIN SCHRAM, AVOIDING ARMAGEDDON 9 (2003).
C.  Modern Nuclear Nightmares
The Cold War is said to have ended in the late 1980’s with perestroika,
glasnost, and ultimately, the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  But those who
take comfort in these political developments, and who consequently believe
that concern over global cataclysm is an overblown relic of an earlier age,
would do well to heed Dr. ElBaradei’s Nobel speech.  As he accepted his
prize, Dr. ElBaradei lamented the fact that, roughly fifteen years after the
collapse of authoritarian communism in Europe, more than twenty thousand
nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the United States, the former Soviet
Union, and other countries.   Significantly, many of those weapons remain on39
high alert status; that is, they can be launched within minutes.   It may be true40
that the risk of an intentional conflict between the Western allies and the
various countries that comprised the former Soviet Union is lower now than
it was fifteen years ago.   On the other hand, the risk of an accidental nuclear41
exchange may actually be higher today than it was during the Cold War
because of the aging command and control systems in the former Soviet
Union  and decreased security at sites that were formerly part of the Soviet42
military-industrial complex.43
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44. See World Arsenals, supra note 30.
45. The “father” of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan, sold a great deal of nuclear weapons technology
on the black market.  See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Pakistani’s Nuclear Black Market Seen as
Offering Deepest Secrets of Building Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at A7; Salman Massod, Health
Concern For Father of Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A9.  Khan is now under house arrest in
Pakistan, but remains a national hero.  David E. Sanger, Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A10.
46. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, New Worry Rises on Iranian Claim of Nuclear Steps,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A1.
47. “North Korea . . . [became] the eighth country in history, and arguably the most unstable and
most dangerous, to proclaim that it ha[d] joined the club of nuclear weapon states.”  David E. Sanger, North
Korea Says It Tested a Nuclear Device Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006 at A1.  Moreover,
the big fear about North Korea, American officials have long said, has less to do with its ability
to lash out than it does with its proclivity to proliferate.  The country has sold its missiles and
other weapons to Iran, Syria and Pakistan; at various moments in the six-party talks that have
gone on for the past few years, North Korean representatives have threatened to sell nuclear
weapons.
Id.
48. Larry Rohter & Juan Forero, Venezuela’s Leader Covets a Nuclear Energy Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, § 1, at 14.
Moreover, an exclusive focus on the illusory security benefits of the
demise of the Soviet-American rivalry overlooks the significant proliferation
of non-Soviet nuclear weapons states since 1949.  Over the past several
decades, a number of other nations have acquired such weapons, including
France, China, India, and almost certainly Israel.   Pakistan also has nuclear44
weapons.   Iran is plainly making such an attempt.   And as this article is45 46
being written, North Korea, one of the most unstable regimes in the world, has
apparently just tested its first atomic weapon.   Many of Dr. ElBaradei’s47
efforts—and a great deal of international diplomacy—are currently directed
at discouraging any further proliferation.  But no one can guarantee the
success of those efforts, and, meanwhile, other nations may follow North
Korea’s lead and enter the nuclear arena at any time.  Ominously, Hugo
Chavez, the President of Venezuela, has recently announced interest in
developing a nuclear power program.   One must wonder why a nation awash48
in petroleum and petroleum revenues would need a nuclear power program.
Perhaps Mr. Chavez is concerned about global warming.
Some proliferation of nuclear weapons is no doubt inevitable, since
nuclear energy in all of its various forms is clearly implied by the immutable
and universal laws of physics, and no nation has a monopoly on scientific
knowledge.  Still, it is troubling that so many different nations have made the
decision to devote their scarce resources to the development of the
enormously expensive technologies necessary for deployment and
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49. See Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Stockpiles:  1945-2006, BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, July/August 2006, at 64.  The standard justification for such stockpiling is the
argument that large, dispersed arsenals deter surprise attacks because a potential aggressor cannot be certain
that it will destroy its opponent’s entire nuclear arsenal in a first strike.  While this argument may have
some merit from the perspective of game theory, it also has some important weaknesses.  First of all, it
presupposes an opponent that is simultaneously irrational enough to contemplate a massive first strike but
rational enough to be deterred by careful calculations of possible levels of nuclear retaliation.  Moreover,
large arsenals create the near-certainty that, if deterrence fails, the resultant nuclear exchange will be far
more destructive than a war fought with smaller numbers of weapons.  Large arsenals also necessarily create
a larger circle of individual civilians and military officers with command-and-control responsibilities, any
one of whom might make a poor decision.
50. Professor Paul Brians of Washington State University has attempted to compile an exhaustive
list of the remarkable outpouring of fictional treatments of nuclear war.  See Paul Brians, Nuclear
Holocausts Bibliography, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/nuclear/a.htm (last visited on Mar. 11, 2007).  His
list, dating back to the late nineteenth century, contains hundreds of entries.
maintenance of nuclear arsenals.  It is equally troubling that several of those
nations, including both the United States and the former Soviet Union, have
made the decision to stockpile huge numbers of such weapons, far in excess
of the total needed to destroy all major targets in each country many times
over.   As has often been noted by various observers, the detonation of any49
one of these weapons under the right circumstances might lead to an
escalation of hostilities ending in a global conflagration.
Moreover, along with the proliferation of so many weapons goes the
proliferation of individual human beings who each have the ability to begin
such a war.  In popular fiction, the president of the United States and his
Soviet or Russian counterpart are often characterized as the two omnipotent
men who have the ability to destroy all of humanity with a single decision.
The reality is far more complex and disturbing.  Given the vagaries of
command and control, there are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of people around
the world who have effective authority over nuclear weapons.  Each of these
individuals, whether civilian or military, well-intentioned or malevolent, sane
or not, may hold the fate of our species in his or her hands.
One fictional treatment  that addresses this particular aspect of the50
nuclear dilemma is Stanley Kubrik’s classic 1964 film satire,
“Dr. Strangelove:  Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.”
In Dr. Strangelove, a mentally unbalanced Air Force general orders his
squadron of B-52 bombers to attack the Soviet Union without provocation.
Despite the concerted efforts of the U.S. and Soviet governments to either
recall or destroy the attacking planes, one bomber manages to evade the Soviet
air defenses, drops a hydrogen bomb, and sets in motion a chain of events in
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51. Or at least driven underground into deep mineshafts for many decades; the conclusion of the film
is open-ended.  In one of the final lines, Air Force General Buck Turgidson, played by actor George C.
Scott, discusses his plans for the aftermath of the nuclear holocaust:
Turgidson:
Yeah.  I think it would be extremely naive of us, Mr. President, to imagine that these new
developments are going to cause any change in Soviet expansionist policy.  I mean, we must be
. . . increasingly on the alert to prevent them from taking over other mineshaft space, in order
to breed more prodigiously than we do, thus, knocking us out in superior numbers when we
emerge!  Mr. President, we must not allow . . . a mine shaft gap!
DR. STRANGELOVE:  OR, HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Kubrick 1964)
[hereinafter DR. STRANGELOVE], available at http://www.visual-memory.co.uk/amk/doc/0055.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2007).
52. According to the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), “a classified Pentagon study
. . . concludes that a nuclear war between these countries could result in 12 million deaths.”  NRDC, The
Consequences of Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007).  The NRDC’s own experts estimate that, in addition to the several million
people who would be killed by nuclear explosions, “22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be
exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack.”  Id.
53. CARL SAGAN, COSMOS 325 (1980).
which human civilization is ultimately destroyed.   In the more than forty51
years since the release of Dr. Strangelove, the chance of such an event has not
diminished; in fact, just the opposite is true.  If Dr. Strangelove were re-made
today, the role of the American Air Force general might better be assigned to
a mid-level Indian or Pakistani military officer who has direct control over
tactical nuclear weapons.  Such a character could be mad, as in Kubrik’s film,
or merely the victim of circumstance.  Indeed, it is all too easy to imagine an
escalating conflict along the unstable, highly-militarized border of the
disputed province of Kashmir, in which a local commander is faced with the
difficult choice of either launching his weapons or losing them to advancing
enemy troops.  It is quite conceivable that such a commander would make the
decision to launch.  The resulting Indo-Pakistani nuclear exchange could kill
millions of people in South Asia alone.   But the damage would not stop52
there.  Lethal radioactive fallout would enter the stratosphere and travel
around the world.   Moreover, any such conflict could quickly spread to53
China, which might easily mistake dozens of nuclear detonations along its
southern border for an attack; then similarly to Russia; then to the rest of the
world.
But as frightening as these doomsday scenarios undoubtedly are, they
perhaps do not present the greatest current risk of global catastrophe.  It is the
rare government official—one hopes—who would consciously make the
decision to commit national suicide by launching an initial nuclear strike
against another nuclear power.  There are, however, other people who have
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54. Terrorists come in many varieties, of course, including various ethnicities and ideological
backgrounds.  At the moment, Islamist terrorists dominate the media.  In his award-winning book, The End
of Faith, commentator Sam Harris uses evocative (and provocative) imagery to describe such people and
their potential to do harm:  “It is though a portal in time has opened, and fourteenth-century hordes are
pouring into our world.  Unfortunately, they are now armed with twenty-first century weapons.”  SAM
HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH 107 (2004).
55. SCHRAM, supra note 43, at 9.
56. JOHN ARISTOTLE PHILLIPS, MUSHROOM:  THE STORY OF THE A-BOMB KID 19 (1978).
57. Id.
58. Paul Collins, The A-Bomb Kid:  Don’t Try This at Home:  The End of the World as We Know
It Is Just a Term Paper Away, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 17, 2003, at C56, available at http://www.villagevoice
.com/news/0351,essay,49520,1.html.
repeatedly declared and, indeed, demonstrated their willingness to use any
means to achieve their goals, even when those means are suicidal.  I refer, of
course, to terrorists.   As has long been acknowledged by experts in the field,54
and as the world learned to its dismay on September 11, 2001, certain people,
often motivated by ideological or spiritual fervor, perhaps personally
desperate or mentally unbalanced, are quite willing, even eager, to kill
innocent people to achieve their objectives.  Therefore, we must consider it a
virtual certainty that if such people obtain weapons of mass destruction, such
as nuclear weapons, they will quickly use them, and in the most destructive
way possible.
Unfortunately, it is not as hard to obtain a nuclear weapon as one might
wish.  The former Soviet Union contains vast stockpiles of poorly-guarded,
highly-enriched, fissionable materials.   If terrorists were to obtain just a few55
pounds of these materials, they would then need only to find a relatively
simple, workable design for a nuclear explosive device.  Such designs are
available.  To take but one famous example, an undergraduate by the name of
John Aristotle Phillips successfully completed in the spring of 1977 a “thirty-
four-page junior independent project for the Princeton Physics Department
[that] outlined plans for a plutonium fission bomb similar to the device
unleashed over Nagasaki in World War II.”   Phillips’s project “demonstrated56
that a terrorist, with a background in college physics, a small amount of stolen
plutonium and the wherewithal to construct the device, could pose a threat to
world peace.”   In a 2003 interview, a then middle-aged Phillips told the57
Village Voice:  “I would never have thought that we’d have gone 25 years
without a terrorist getting a nuclear device. . . . I’m surprised it hasn’t
happened.  I still do expect it.”58
The implications of nuclear-armed terrorists would be staggering.  Indeed,
former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the Chair of the 9/11
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59. Kean is unquestionably correct in his statement:  “The most dangerous gap is the possibility of
a terrorist with a nuclear weapon.”  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Assures That the Nation Is Safer as
Memories Turn to a Day of Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A25.  Kean also said, “We still
haven’t done enough to contain about a hundred sites around the world that have enriched uranium.”  Id.
60. NORAD stands for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, which operates the U.S.
early warning system.  See Andy Walton, Cheyenne Mountain:  America’s Underground Watch Tower,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/experience/the.bomb/route/01.cheyenne/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007).  Its primary operations center is located in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, near Colorado
Springs.  Id.
Commission, characterizes “the possibility of a terrorist with a nuclear
weapon” as “the most dangerous gap” in American security.   I would amend59
Mr. Kean’s statement only by substituting the plural for the singular; for if
terrorists are able to obtain a single nuclear weapon, there is little to prevent
them from obtaining two, or three, or perhaps a dozen.
Consider the situation faced by an American president who is awakened
by an early-morning telephone call from his Secretary of Defense announcing
an act of nuclear terrorism.  If a recording system similar to those used by
Presidents Kennedy and Nixon were attached to the telephone, a transcript
might read something like this:
SecDef: Mr. President, I’m sorry to awaken you at this hour, but we have good
reason to believe that we are under attack.
President: What?  What’s going on?
SecDef: Sir, we have received credible reports that a nuclear weapon has been
detonated in lower Manhattan. . . .
President: [Interrupting] Oh, my God.
SecDef: . . . Initial reports indicate that most of the southern end of the island has
been destroyed, up to about 30th Street.  Much of downtown Brooklyn is
on fire.  Apparently, the bomb was detonated from inside a delivery van on
the Manhattan side of the Brooklyn Bridge.
President: Oh my God.
SecDef: Mr. Pres—
President: How do you know that—about the van?
SecDef: A group associated with the Al Qaeda terrorist network claimed
responsibility about a minute before the explosion occurred, so we are
confident that the claim is credible.  They described the delivery van on the
bridge, and that location is consistent with the blast radius of the explosion.
President: Oh, my God.
SecDef: Mr. President, we need to evacuate you immediately.  This group, whoever
it is, claims to have more than one weapon.  They claim that if their
demands aren’t met immediately, they will detonate another weapon in
another . . . just a moment . . . just a . . . Mr. President, I have just received
a report from NORAD  that two more targets have been hit—Chicago and,60
I believe San Francisco, or maybe it’s Oakland . . . .
President: [Unintelligible; multiple voices in background]
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61. Franklin O’Donnell, SETI News, Fourth Quarter, 1992, Goldstone Scans the Sky,
http://www.seti.org/site/pp.asp?c=ktJ2J9MMIsE&b=179144.
SecDef: . . . I’m receiving confirmation, now, Mr. President.  It was San Francisco.
San Francisco and Chicago.  We have no idea how bad it is, but NORAD
says that confidence is high that nuclear explosions have occurred near the
downtown sections of both cities.  According to our early warning
satellites, there were no inbound missiles.  The explosions occurred at or
near ground level.
President: [Long pause]  So it’s terrorists.  What are their demands?
SecDef: It’s a long list.  I think the biggest things are the immediate withdrawal of
all American military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and, I
think, pretty much everywhere in Europe and the Middle East.  And also,
I think . . . just a moment . . . yes, the immediate renunciation of our
security commitments to Israel, and the establishment of a Palestinian state
with Jerusalem as the capital city, with immediate transfer of one trillion
U.S. dollars to the new Palestinian government, and . . . there’s a lot more
here, Mr. President.
President: What are my options, Mr. Secretary?
SecDef: Sir, the Marine One helicopter should be arriving to evacuate you in about
five minutes—
President: [Interrupting] No, Mr. Secretary.  I mean, what are my options with regard
to the terrorist demands?
SecDef: [Silence]
This scenario could occur today.  And it could be much worse.  For example,
an American President might be confronted with several nuclear detonations
with no clear idea of who was behind them.  The U.S. might mistake them for
an attack by another country and erroneously order a retaliatory response, with
devastating results.
D.  Humanity’s Technological Adolescence
All of this is very frightening.  But the development, deployment, and
proliferation of thermonuclear weapons represents merely the beginning of
what the late astronomer Carl Sagan called society’s “technological
adolescence”—a period of time when humanity’s ability to destroy itself
perhaps exceeds its collective wisdom.   The future of our society is,61
therefore, very much an open question:
Human history can be viewed as a slowly dawning awareness that we are members of a
larger group.  Initially our loyalties were to ourselves and our immediate family, next, to
bands of wandering hunter gatherers, then to tribes, small settlements, city-states, nations.
We have broadened the circle of those we love.  We have now organized what are
modestly described as superpowers, which include groups of people from divergent
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62. SAGAN, supra note 53, at 339.
63. HARRIS, supra note 54, at 47 (footnote omitted).
64. Gordon Moore, founder of Intel, famously predicted in 1965 that the number of transistors on
a silicon chip would grow with increasing rapidity, doubling roughly every two years.  See John Markoff,
I.B.M. Researchers Find a Way To Keep Moore’s Law on Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at C4.  This
prediction, now generally called “Moore’s Law,” has guided and prodded the phenomenal advances in the
electronics industry for the past four decades.  See id.  According to Professor Ian Mackintosh, formerly
a silicon chip researcher at Bell Laboratories:
Moore’s Law reflects the extraordinary improvements in silicon technology in last 40
years.
. . . .
Practically anything digital has depended critically on the swift improvement in chip
density . . . . [Without this improvement, we] wouldn’t have mobile phones, laptops, digital
cameras, some of the advances in medical technology, electronic games, satellites, GPS, and on
and on.
Jo Twist, Law That Has Driven Digital Life, BBC NEWS, Apr. 18, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/
nature/4449711.stm.
Moore’s Law has proven remarkably prescient, despite repeated declarations of its demise, most
notably by Moore himself.  See Manek Dubash, Moore’s Law is Dead, Says Gordon Moore, TECHWORLD,
Apr. 13, 2005, http://www.techworld.com/opsys/news/index.cfm?NewsID=3477 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
ethnic and cultural backgrounds working in some sense together—surely a humanizing
and character-building experience.  If we are to survive, our loyalties must be broadened
further, to include the whole human community, the entire planet Earth.  Many of those
who run the nations will find this idea unpleasant.  They will fear the loss of power.  We
will hear much about treason and disloyalty.  Rich nation-states will have to share their
wealth with poor ones.  But the choice, as H.G. Wells once said in a different context, is
clearly the universe or nothing.62
Sagan is not alone in his assessment.  Commentator Sam Harris notes that:
Two hundred years from now, when we are a thriving global civilization beginning to
colonize space, something about us will have changed; it must have; otherwise, we would
have killed ourselves ten times over before this day ever dawned.  We are fast
approaching a time when the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction will be a trivial
undertaking; the requisite information and technology are now seeping into every corner
of our world.  As the physicist Martin Rees points out, “We are entering an era where a
single person can, by one clandestine act, cause millions of deaths or render a city
uninhabitable for years . . . .”63
Much like a teenager who soups up a car so that it can reach ever-more-
dangerous speeds, humanity is daily inventing new technologies that, while
increasing the pace, productivity, and comfort of human existence, are also
increasingly dangerous.  And the rate of technological advance is itself
escalating.   While no one can predict what the next catastrophically64
dangerous invention will be, it is certain that more of them will soon appear.
Indeed, some already exist.  Small quantities of advanced chemical weapons
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can wipe out cities; larger quantities can sterilize continents.   Virulent65
microorganisms, bioengineered to resist vaccines and antidotes, could spread
across the globe in a matter of weeks.   Even allegedly peaceful technologies,66
such as genetically-engineered crops, could go awry, causing worldwide
famine or disease.67
Once again, nuclear history is instructive.  The breathtaking power of an
atomic explosion was theoretically predicted in 1905, when Einstein published
his famous equation, E = mc .  In that equation, “E” represents the energy that2
can be generated by a given mass of matter, represented by “m.”  The
enormity of this energy is made apparent by the value of “c,” which stands for
the speed of light, an astronomically large number.  Indeed, “c” is not only
very large by itself.  According to the equation, it is then squared, yielding a
number so high that it is almost beyond human comprehension.  Thus, a
relatively small amount of matter—say, a few pounds of plutonium—can,
under the right conditions, release stupendous amounts of energy.  However,
for more than thirty years, Einstein himself thought it highly unlikely that
human beings would find a way to create those conditions in the near future.
Early attempts to release atomic energy by fission, or the “splitting” of
atomic nuclei, seemed to prove Einstein correct.  In 1932, British physicists
John D. Cockcroft and Ernest T.S. Walton accelerated or “shot” protons at the
nuclei of other atoms, splitting some of the target nuclei.   Many of these68
protons were, however, deflected by the positive charges of the protons in the
target nuclei or by the negative charges of the electrons circling those nuclei.69
Thus, very few atoms were split, and very little energy was released—less
energy, in fact, than it took to accelerate the protons.   In 1933, renowned70
physicist Lord Ernest Rutherford, director of Britain’s Cavendish Laboratory,
told the The Times of London that splitting atoms in this fashion “was a very
poor and inefficient way of producing energy, and anyone who looked for a
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source of power in the transformation of the atoms was talking moonshine.”71
Nuclear energy seemed to be locked in the realm of the theoretical.
However, an expatriate Hungarian physicist by the name of Leo Szilard
found Rutherford’s “moonshine” comment in the Times article “rather
irritating because how can anyone know what someone else might invent?”72
A few weeks later, Szilard suddenly realized that Rutherford was indeed
wrong:
As I was waiting for the light to change and as the light changed to green and I crossed
the street, it suddenly occurred to me that if we could find an element which is split by
neutrons and which would emit two neutrons when it absorbed one neutron, such an
element, if assembled in sufficiently large mass, could sustain a nuclear chain reaction.
I didn’t see at the moment just how one would go about finding such an element or what
experiments would be needed, but the idea never left me.73
Szilard had deduced what now seems an obvious point, but which until that
moment had eluded the best minds of his generation:  by accelerating
neutrons—which, as their name implies, have a neutral charge—instead of
protons, the problem of proton deflection would be eliminated.  As a
consequence, atoms could be far more easily “split” and their energy more
efficiently released.  Indeed, it was Szilard who immediately realized, to his
own horror, that neutron bombardment opened the door not only to carefully-
controlled nuclear fission, which could be used for peaceful purposes, but to
uncontrolled chain reactions, or atomic explosions.  It was this realization,
along with Szilard’s firsthand knowledge that the country with the most
advanced physics in the world was Nazi Germany, that eventually prompted
him, along with Princeton physics professor Eugene Wigner, to track down
Einstein at his vacation cottage on Long Island in the summer of 1939.
Szilard and Wigner explained Szilard’s ideas, as well as some recent
calculations they had performed together regarding the fission of uranium.
During the conversation, which took place in German, Einstein responded to
these revelations with the statement, “Daran habe ich gar nicht gedacht” [I
hadn’t thought of that at all].   That same day, Einstein agreed to sign a letter74
warning of the imminent possibility of a Nazi atomic weapon.  Soon
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thereafter, Szilard had the letter hand-delivered directly to President Franklin
Roosevelt:
Albert Einstein
Old Grove Rd.
Nassau Point
Peconic, Long Island
August 2nd, 1939
F.D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.
Sir,
Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me
in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and
important source of energy in the immediate future.  Certain aspects of the situation
which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part
of the Administration.  I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the
following facts and recommendations:
. . . .
This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is
conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs of a new type
may thus be constructed . . . .
. . . .
I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the
Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over.  That she should have taken such early
action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-
Secretary of State, von Weizsacker, is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin
where some of the American work on uranium is now being repeated.
Yours very truly,
Albert Einstein75
So Einstein, perhaps the most prominent scientist in history, had to admit that
he (and almost every other physicist of his day) had been wrong:  it was far
easier to release atomic energy than had long been believed.  The power of the
universe was suddenly at humanity’s fingertips, for good and for ill.
Perhaps tomorrow, perhaps next week, humanity’s power will increase
again, perhaps exponentially—“because how can anyone know what someone
else might invent?”  There seems, tragically, to be far slower progress in the
advancement of human wisdom.  So the question presented by our
technological adolescence remains poignantly open:  will our wisdom catch
up with our technology before we use that technology to destroy ourselves?
810 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:785
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
E.  Summary
I hope that I have adequately demonstrated what to me seem several
unwelcome yet obvious points:  1) information that is inherently,
catastrophically dangerous now exists, and has existed for at least the past six
decades; 2) the type and amount of catastrophically dangerous information is
growing with increasing rapidity; 3) the available evidence, both historical and
scientific, suggests that such information will eventually be used to destroy
human civilization; and therefore, 4) it is in society’s interest to keep
catastrophically dangerous information out of the hands of incompetent or
malevolent people.  While we may only postpone the inevitable, it is an
inevitable worth postponing.
On the other hand, I must acknowledge the equally obvious point that
attaching legal penalties to the mere possession of information that may
already be in the public domain presents difficult constitutional questions, at
least in the United States.  These obstacles become surmountable when we
recognize that my proposal calls for an exception to the protections of the First
Amendment which, to a great extent, already exists.  Indeed, this exception is
more justified than other exceptions that have long existed, however uneasily,
within established First Amendment jurisprudence.
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A.  A Jurisprudence of Exceptions
The relevant language of the First Amendment is straightforward and
succinct:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .76
It is also absolute, as noted by Justice Hugo Black in a famous dissenting
opinion joined by Justice William O. Douglas and Chief Justice Earl Warren:
As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that [balancing] doctrine for
I believe that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our
Bill of Rights did all the “balancing” that was to be done in this field.  The history of the
First Amendment is too well known to require repeating here except to say that it
certainly cannot be denied that the very object of adopting the First Amendment, as well
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as the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was to put the freedoms protected there
completely out of the area of any congressional control that may be attempted through
the exercise of precisely those powers that are now being used to “balance” the Bill of
Rights out of existence.77
This absolutist position in First Amendment jurisprudence may be the only
one that is logically consistent, but it has never been generally accepted.
Instead, most courts —and most law professors —find it necessary to carve78 79
out one or more exceptions to the absolutist position.   These exceptions80
include such familiar concepts as “incitement,” “hate speech” and
“obscenity.”  Equally familiar are a host of other legal liabilities for various
forms of verbal or written communication that are constitutionally imposed
pursuant to both criminal and civil law.  These liabilities include prohibitions
of fraud, perjury, defamation, false advertising and other forms of
misrepresentation, as well as causes of action in tort, such as invasion of
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privacy, which penalize truthful, but nonetheless prohibited, speech.  Thus,
First Amendment law can be described as a jurisprudence of exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting governmental abridgment of speech or of the press.
The fundamental problem with such a jurisprudence is definitional.
Much of the definitional debate comes down to line-drawing:  which speech
is to be restricted and which protected, and why?  This question, no matter the
particular context, is always difficult and has led to the near-demise of several
exceptions.  “Obscenity” is perhaps the most notable example, and Justice
Stewart’s frustrated declaration, “I know it when I see it,”  is the most famous81
First Amendment punt.  Even the narrowly-drawn and widely-supported
exception for child pornography raises difficult factual and definitional issues:
Who is a child?  Who is an adult?  What about drawings, as opposed to
photographs?  What about realistic, yet virtual, images depicting children
engaging in sexual activities or being abused by adults?  Yet despite these
difficulties, child pornography, like obscenity generally, and like all speech
falling within the other judicially-recognized exceptions, remains either
unprotected or less-protected by the First Amendment.  In each instance, our
law recognizes that some competing value (e.g., protection of children)82
trumps the constitutional right to free expression.
The existing First Amendment exception that is most relevant to our
discussion is, of course, the national security exception of Near v. Minnesota83
and its progeny.  However, before discussing Near, it is appropriate to begin,
as does most First Amendment jurisprudence, with a definition.
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B.  Catastrophically Dangerous Information Defined
Something that is “catastrophic” can be defined as, “a momentous tragic
event ranging from extreme misfortune to utter overthrow or ruin.”   This84
dictionary definition captures the acute nature of the word:  a catastrophic
event does not involve garden-variety misfortune, but only “extreme
misfortune” or “utter . . . ruin.”
However, this common definition still covers a wide range of tragedies,
from those affecting only one individual to those impacting all of humanity.
Obviously, I am more concerned with the latter.  However, I am not concerned
solely with doomsday threats.  As noted at the outset of this paper, I am also
concerned with lesser, yet still major, threats, such as those that menace entire
cities or nations.  I focus upon these threats both because of their inherent
significance and because of the potential they have for causing even greater
harm.
Here we reach the classic line-drawing dilemma:  if we define the word
“catastrophic” too broadly, we will likely restrict too much information;
however, if we define the word too narrowly, for example to only include
events that are clearly planetary in scope, we will not adequately address the
problem at hand.  Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is to consider
some of the elements that might make a particular event “catastrophic” enough
to pose a serious threat, even if somewhat indirect, to all of humanity.
The first such element is clear:  large numbers of casualties, especially
fatalities.  At the risk of trivializing this first and most important index of
catastrophe, I must note that one is again reminded of the movie satire,
Dr. Strangelove.  In a famous scene, a high ranking Air Force general is seated
at a conference table in the Pentagon’s “War Room,” next to a binder with the
notable title, “World Targets in Megadeaths.”  This title is not merely the
product of artistic license.  The term “megadeath” is actually a word used in
discussions of nuclear warfare.  It is defined as one million deaths.   Although85
it is impossible to quantify the value of even a single human life with any
precision, any threat that might cause one or more megadeaths would likely
present the sort of danger we are trying to avoid.
Another element is equally clear, especially after the televised images of
the collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001:  major
property damage of a type and scale to cause major economic disruption.
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Economic disruption causes human suffering directly.  It can also lead to
political and military instability.
Which leads us to the last major factor to consider:  whether a particular
threat could directly cause political or military chaos.  One obvious example
is the destruction of the political or military leadership of a given country.
Countries that suddenly lose their political or military leadership are ripe for
invasion, revolution and civil unrest—in a word, chaos—and such chaos does
not necessarily stop at national borders.
These three elements—a large number of casualties, major property
damage, and destruction of a nation’s political or military leadership—suggest
a reasonable starting point for defining the term “catastrophic:”  an event
causing damage roughly equivalent to the destruction of a nation’s political
or financial capital.  If we use this level of potential destruction as a
benchmark, we will focus on only those events which pose the most serious
threats while excluding those of a lesser nature.
It is similarly difficult to come up with a workable definition of what
constitutes “dangerous information.”  Once again, if our definition is
overbroad we run the risk of restricting too much information.  On the other
hand, if our definition is underinclusive, then seemingly innocent scientific
information which can be turned to catastrophic purposes will escape our
attention and remain a significant threat.  Although any definition is somewhat
arbitrary, a reasonable starting point would include specific, technical plans
or formulae that could be used with a reasonable effort to cause catastrophic
damage.  Such information would obviously include design information for
what are commonly called weapons of mass destruction.  However, it would
also include other technical information that could cause major harm, such as
formulae for nerve agents or for the genetic codes of dangerous viruses and
bacteria, and other similar, highly technical, highly specific information.
It is important, at the outset, to note the sort of information that would not
be included in this definition:  non-technical information relating to these
topics.  In other words, there would be no restriction on the vast majority of
information that is relevant to open, public debate regarding political,
scientific or military affairs.  I realize the difficulty in distinguishing between
what information is, and is not, necessary for a full and robust public
discussion.  I also understand that there are those who insist that no restriction
on any information is compatible with free political debate.  Journalist
Howard Morland comes to mind.  Mr. Morland played a significant role in a
case that will be discussed later in this paper, United States v. Progressive,
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on the publication of a newsmagazine article in which Morland purported to
reveal the “secret” of the hydrogen bomb.  It is Morland’s position that
governmental secrecy regarding nuclear weapons gives the government a
monopoly on credibility by cloaking in mystery the political debate about such
weapons.   Therefore, Mr. Morland feels that there should be no nuclear87
secrets, and that the only way to eventually abolish nuclear weapons is to fully
share nuclear weapons technology with the entire world.  Only then will an
informed populace insist upon banning those weapons:
If industrial civilization lasts another thousand years, during all but a few of those
years the complete story of the W-88 [thermonuclear] warhead and all other such devices
will be available on the Internet.  Such information cannot be permanently suppressed.
Whenever someone invents something that works, other people will figure out how it was
done.
Nonetheless, I am confident that all nuclear weapons will have been banned from the
earth, and that foolproof controls will have been imposed on the critical nuclear
materials.  The global public consensus for this nuclear weapons abolition will be based
on widespread understanding of the technology.  In my opinion, these are necessary
conditions for human survival, and our generation has the responsibility to make it
happen.88
There is, however, an obvious danger to such an approach.  Moreover, I do not
believe it is necessary.  If the reader will forgive a personal anecdote, I recall
that when I studied nuclear weapons policy at Princeton twenty-five years ago,
I was able to come to some very definite and, I believe, well-informed
opinions regarding nuclear weapons.  However, at no time did I have access
to classified technical information.  Nor did I need it.  It was not necessary to
know precisely how a hydrogen bomb works in order to know that a single
such weapon is capable of destroying an entire city and of spewing radioactive
poison over thousands of square miles.  Reading Mr. Morland’s article (which
was eventually published)  added nothing to my understanding or analysis.89
But it may well have increased the threat of nuclear proliferation by a country
intent on constructing its own thermonuclear device.  The fact that no country
has detonated a hydrogen bomb since 1979 is cold comfort, and probably
attributable more to the cost of doing so than anything else.  But whenever a
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nation with the resources makes the decision to build a fusion bomb, the
Morland article’s detailed design information may well contribute to that
country’s success, notwithstanding recent and naïve pronouncements to the
contrary.90
To summarize, “catastrophically dangerous information,” (which I will
hereafter refer to as CDI) though not amenable to a precise definition, might
reasonably be interpreted to mean technical information that would enable
terrorists or other malevolent or incompetent people to destroy a political or
economic capital city.  Armed with this working definition, it is now
appropriate to examine how CDI is addressed in the law as it currently stands.
C.  The Current State of the Law Regarding Catastrophically Dangerous
Information
There is no law dealing specifically with the issue of CDI as I have
defined it, which is not surprising, given the novelty of the definition.
However, there is a fair amount of relevant law dealing with the subject of
secret information.  For our purposes, this law can be divided into two general
areas:  (1) governmental information and (2) non-governmental information.
1.  Governmental Information
Restrictions on information that the government wishes to keep secret is
familiar territory.  All governments, including the United States government,
try to protect their secrets.  The secrets they are most interested in protecting
are, of course, secrets involving the military, diplomacy and espionage.  Oft-
cited dictum in Near strongly suggests that the government may do so:  “No
one would question but that a government might prevent . . . the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”   This91
language is the basis for the “national security” exception to the First
Amendment, which permits, inter alia, the enactment of federal statutes which
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allow or even require the withholding of governmental information.   These92
statutes include, ironically, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),  which93
specifically exempts “classified” information from public disclosure.   They94
also include the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982,  which95
criminalizes the disclosure of the identity of a covert agent.   This particular96
statute has been much in the news of late, as the media has covered the
political brouhaha over the Valerie Plame affair.  As this article was being
prepared for publication, former Vice-Presidential Chief of Staff I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby was convicted of perjuring himself to a grand jury
investigating the disclosure of the identity of CIA agent Valerie Plame
Wilson.  Although the prosecution in the Libby case decided not to bring
charges against Mr. Libby for revealing classified governmental information,
its reasons for doing so were likely only evidentiary.   If the prosecution had97
managed to obtain adequate proof of Mr. Libby’s intent in disclosing this
information to the press, it is fairly clear that prosecution for the disclosure
would have been constitutional.98
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2.  Non-governmental Information
a.  Classified Information in the Public Domain
While it is clear that the government may prohibit and even criminalize
disclosure of classified information, a more difficult question arises once that
information is, in fact, divulged.  What happens when the secrets get out?
There are not many cases in this area of the law, and the few that exist
offer conflicting guidance.  In some situations, courts seem to be willing to
allow the government to recapture information that has been inappropriately
divulged, at least if that information has not been widely disseminated.  In
American Library Association v. Faurer,  a federal district court considered99
the request of a library to remove restrictions upon cryptographic information
donated to the library by a former employee of the National Security Agency
(NSA).  The NSA had allowed public access to the information before later
re-classifying it pursuant to an Executive Order allowing re-classification “if
the information may reasonably be recovered.”   The court rejected the100
library’s claim that, once the information entered the public domain, the First
Amendment barred the government from recovering it:  “A close examination
of the relevant case law in light of the facts of this case leads the Court to
conclude that no first amendment right exists where disclosure of classified
information would possibly endanger the national security, even though the
information had been previously in the public domain.”101
More recently, in Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush,  a102
federal district court ordered a plaintiff to return a classified document that the
government had inadvertently disclosed, even though the government
presumed that the document had been widely disseminated.  Al-Haramain
involved a challenge to the Bush Administration’s electronic surveillance
program.  In ordering the return of the classified document at issue, the court
explained:
I accept the government’s argument that the inadvertent disclosure of the Sealed
Document does not declassify it or waive the state secrets privilege . . . .
The Executive has not granted authority to plaintiffs to review classified materials,
and the document remains classified.  In addition, if plaintiffs were given full access to
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the document, plaintiffs may refer back to it and reflect on what it does or does not
disclose.  For example, they may confirm which modes of communication were
vulnerable to interception and avoid those modes.  The government has raised sufficient
grounds for concern and I grant the government’s motion.103
Thus, the Al-Haramain court recognized the value of allowing the government
to re-capture classified information.  It specifically recognized that, even if the
plaintiffs had seen the document once, more harm to national security might
occur if the plaintiffs were allowed to see it again.
However, other courts, and other individual federal judges, have made
statements that seem to run counter to the approach taken in Faurer and Al-
Haramain.  In a case regarding senatorial privilege related to the infamous
Pentagon Papers case,  Justice Douglas remarked in a dissenting opinion:104
“Aside from the question of the extent to which publishers can be penalized
for printing classified documents, surely the First Amendment protects against
all inquiry into the dissemination of information which, although once
classified, has become part of the public domain.”   Similarly, in Marchetti,105
in which the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order that a former CIA
employee return classified information to the agency, the court also noted that,
“[i]nformation, though classified, may have been publicly disclosed.  If it has
been, Marchetti should have as much right as anyone else to re-publish it.”106
On the other hand, the Marchetti court was not eager to find that classified
information had, in fact, been publicly disclosed:  “Rumor and speculation are
not the equivalent of prior disclosure, however, and the presence of that kind
of surmise should be no reason for avoidance of restraints upon confirmation
from one in a position to know officially.”107
In Snepp v. United States,  the U.S. Supreme Court considered the case108
of a former CIA employee who, like Marchetti, had published a book about
his experiences.  In Snepp, the Court upheld a contract between the former
employee and the CIA requiring prior review of any publications based upon
the former employment.  It did so despite the fact that the book at issue
contained no classified information.  Nonetheless, the Court also noted that,
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“[i]f in fact information is unclassified or in the public domain, neither the
CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned.”109
In United States v. Rosen,  a federal district court recently emphasized110
the extent of the government’s power to control classified information as
established and illustrated by Marchetti and Snepp:
Taken together, Marchetti and Snepp stand for the proposition that government
employees’ speech can be subjected to prior restraints where the government is seeking
to protect its legitimate national security interests.  Because prior restraints on speech are
the most constitutionally suspect form of a government restriction, it follows from this
proposition that Congress may constitutionally subject to criminal prosecution anyone
who exploits a position of trust to obtain and disclose NDI [information relating to the
national defense] to one not entitled to receive it.111
Rosen involved the Espionage Act prosecution of lobbyists who had allegedly
obtained and transmitted NDI to Israel.  Among other things, the defendants
argued that the First Amendment prevented their prosecution because they
held no position of trust with the U.S. Government:
[D]efendants here contend that the First Amendment bars Congress from punishing those
persons, like defendants, without a special relationship to the government for the
disclosure of NDI.  In essence, their position is that once a government secret has been
leaked to the general public and the first line of defense thereby breached, the
government has no recourse but to sit back and watch as the threat to the national security
caused by the first disclosure multiplies with every subsequent disclosure.  This position
cannot be sustained.  Although the question whether the government’s interest in
preserving its national defense secrets is sufficient to trump the First Amendment rights
of those not in a position of trust with the government is a . . . difficult question, and
although the authority addressing this issue is sparse, both common sense and the
relevant precedent point persuasively to the conclusion that the government can punish
those outside of the government for the unauthorized receipt and deliberate
retransmission of information relating to the national defense.112
On the other hand, the Rosen court would not have extended the government’s
power into the public domain generally, at least not under the Espionage Act:
As construed herein, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (e) punish only those people who transmit
information related to the national defense, in tangible or intangible form, to one not
entitled to receive it.  To prove that the information is related to the national defense, the
government must prove:  (1) that the information relates to the nation’s military activities,
2007] FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE END OF THE WORLD 821
113. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
114. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
intelligence gathering or foreign policy, (2) that the information is closely held by the
government, in that it does not exist in the public domain; and (3) that the information
is such that its disclosure could cause injury to the nation’s security.113
The most relevant case involving the release of classified information into
the public domain is, of course, United States v. Progressive, Inc., mentioned
above.  The procedural history of the Progressive case is truly remarkable.
Twenty-eight years ago, in the spring of 1979, U.S. District Judge Robert W.
Warren of the Western District of Wisconsin faced an extraordinary request.
He was asked to do something that was, or should be, anathema to any
American judge, in almost any imaginable situation:  the United States
government wanted him to order the prior, and permanent, restraint of an
article slated for imminent publication in a political magazine.  As
extraordinary as the request was, its justification was even more remarkable.
According to the government, the article in question included detailed,
technical descriptions, including meticulous drawings, of the inner workings
of a thermonuclear weapon—in common parlance, it allegedly contained the
blueprints for a hydrogen bomb.
Faced with this extraordinary request in this remarkable situation, Judge
Warren did an equally-extraordinary thing.  For only the second time in the
history of the federal judiciary, he ordered the prior restraint of an article the
press wanted to publish.  His reasons were compelling:
The Court is faced with the difficult task of weighing and resolving these divergent
views.
A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously infringe cherished First
Amendment rights.  If a preliminary injunction is issued, it will constitute the first
instance of prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the history of this
country, to this Court’s knowledge.  Such notoriety is not to be sought.  It will curtail
defendants’ First Amendment rights in a drastic and substantial fashion.  It will infringe
upon our right to know and to be informed as well.
A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear
annihilation for us all.  In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to
publish becomes moot.114
Judge Warren distinguished, on both factual and statutory grounds, the
Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States.  First, New York
Times involved only historical data; second, disclosure of the historical data
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caused no more harm to the government than embarrassment; finally, a
specific statute authorized prior restraint:
This case is different in several important respects.  In the first place, the study
involved in the New York Times case contained historical data relating to events that
occurred some three to twenty years previously.  Secondly, the Supreme Court agreed
with the lower court that no cogent reasons were advanced by the government as to why
the article affected national security except that publication might cause some
embarrassment to the United States.
A final and most vital difference between these two cases is the fact that a specific
statute is involved here.  Section 2274 of The Atomic Energy Act prohibits anyone from
communicating, transmitting or disclosing any restricted data to any person “with reason
to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage
to any foreign nation.”
Section 2014 of the Act defines restricted data.  “‘Restricted Data’ means all data
concerning 1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; 2) the production
of special nuclear material; or 3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of
energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data
category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.”115
In reaching his decision, Judge Warren considered arguments by
journalist Howard Morland and The Progressive, Inc. that the government was
inappropriately seeking to restrain publication of information that Morland
had lawfully located through several months of research in the public domain:
Defendants contend that the projected article merely contains data already in the
public domain and readily available to any diligent seeker.  They say other nations
already have the same information or the opportunity to obtain it.  How then, they argue,
can they be in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274(b) and 2280 which purport to authorize
injunctive relief against one who would disclose restricted data “with reason to believe
such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any
foreign nation . . .”?
Although the government states that some of the information is in the public domain,
it contends that much of the data is not, and that the Morland article contains a core of
information that has never before been published.
Furthermore, the government’s position is that whether or not specific information is
“in the public domain” or has been “declassified” at some point is not determinative.  The
government states that a court must look at the nature and context of prior disclosures
and analyze what the practical impact of the prior disclosures are as contrasted to that of
the present revelation.116
Judge Warren ultimately agreed with the government’s theory that Morland’s
own synthesis of ideas that were arguably in the public domain constituted
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“restricted data” which the government could statutorily (and constitutionally)
suppress:
Even if some of the information is in the public domain, due recognition must be given
to the human skills and expertise involved in writing this article.  The author needed
sufficient expertise to recognize relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, information and to
assimilate the information obtained.  The right questions had to be asked or the correct
educated guesses had to be made.117
Judge Warren issued his preliminary injunction on March 26, 1979.  On
June 15, Judge Warren denied a motion for reconsideration which was again
premised upon assertions that the information at issue had been released into
the public domain.   Judge Warren made a factual finding that not all of the118
information had been released, and more significantly for our purposes,
rejected an argument that inadvertent disclosure of some classified
information prevented the government from recapturing the classified
information:
In this case, UCRL 4725 and UCRL 5280 were inadvertently declassified in toto.
They were available to the public at the Los Alamos Scientific Library.  However, as
soon as the declassification error was discovered, the documents were removed from the
public shelves.
Whether or not the secret was compromised by this error can only be a matter of
conjecture.  The Court has reviewed the affidavits regarding access and is unable to
conclude one way or another whether the vital data was obtained by scientists or
intelligence agents from other nations.
Prior release of classified information should not be binding on the government if, at
a later time, it is determined that further release would jeopardize national security.
The Court is compelled to the conclusion that, from a legal point of view, the
government’s error in inadvertently declassifying UCRL 4725 and UCRL 5280 did not
move these documents into “the public domain” and further, that there is no showing that
the injunction became ineffectual.119
Several more months of intense litigation followed, litigation that
reached, on a procedural issue at least, all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.   Then, as the United States Court of Appeals for the120
Seventh Circuit prepared to decide the case on its merits, it all suddenly
ended.  On September 17, 1979, faced with the sobering fact that all of the
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information it was seeking to protect had been released over the preceding
several weeks into the public domain, the government dropped its case.   On121
October 1, 1979, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal without a published
decision.122
Was the government right to drop its case?  Commentators generally seem
to think so.  In an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the Atomic
Energy Act, Professor Mary M. Cheh criticizes Judge Warren’s opinions and
laments the Progressive case’s inconclusive conclusion as a missed
opportunity to narrow the reach of the Act to only governmental
information.   The participants in the Progressive case, notably Howard123
Morland and The Progressive’s editor, Erwin Knoll,  continue to object to124
the government’s initial position and Judge Warren’s decisions.  Although
generalizations are risky, it is probably safe to say that, at a minimum, most
of those who have commented on the Progressive case, whether lawyers,
journalists or others, believe that once governmental information is released
into the public domain, the government loses whatever authority it may have
had to regulate it.   That is, once the cat is out of the bag, most commentators125
believe that it should stay there.  Indeed, in a different context, I have myself
acknowledged that “once information is out there in cyberspace, it is out there
forever.”126
There are, of course, a few voices on the other side of the issue.  Although
no one from the legal academy seems to have come to Judge Warren’s
defense, a number of commentators have expressed concern over the wide
availability of various kinds of dangerous information, especially since the
advent of the Internet, and have argued for restrictions upon that
information.   At least one former public official has made a similar127
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argument.  James R. Schlesinger gave a presentation at a 2004 symposium at
the Cardozo School of Law marking the 25th anniversary of the Progressive
case.  Mr. Schlesinger had been Secretary of Energy during the Progressive
case and played a prominent role in the initiation of the litigation.   Alone128
among the symposium participants, Mr. Schlesinger defended Judge Warren,
albeit with disturbing resignation:  “In conclusion, I suggest that though Judge
Warren was right in his logic, in the law and in his order, time has passed this
issue by, and that the possibilities of suppressing information through prior
restraint, for better or worse, have largely evaporated.”   Despite his129
resignation, however, Mr. Schlesinger also suggested that, at least in an earlier
time, release of classified information into the public domain did not
necessarily thwart governmental attempts to maintain secrecy.  He specifically
cited
the episode during World War II in which the Chicago Tribune had published the fact
that the United States had broken the Japanese code.  If the Japanese had known that,
they would not have lost the battle of Midway—which was the turning point not only of
the war of the Pacific, but also of the Second World War.  Happily, the Japanese did not
read the Chicago Tribune on that particular day.  Similarly, there may be momentary
access to information that should not be released.  That does not mean that because the
protective mechanism has broken down on one occasion that one throws the restraints
aside.130
It is notable that even Schlesinger, who defended Judge Warren, seems to
think that modern technology, notably the Internet, now renders control of
public domain information futile.  This attitude is also reflected in the
materials distributed at the Cardozo conference.  After questioning whether
“there are any meaningful nuclear secrets left to reveal,” the conference
materials propose no solution, but piously note that “the answer today turns
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as it did then on whether we believe that an informed global citizenry will act
for life and not for death—and whether that will be enough.”131
b.  Information Originating in the Public Domain
While cases involving the unauthorized release of classified information
are difficult, an even tougher question is presented when the government seeks
to regulate information that did not originate as governmental information,
that is, when the information was generated in the public domain.  That was,
of course, one of the issues in the Progressive case.  Other than Progressive,
such cases are rare.  However, they do occasionally arise in the context of
overseas technology sales.  In United States v. Edler Industries,  the Ninth132
Circuit considered the convictions of two defendants for “exporting, without
a license, technical data relating to articles on the United States Munitions
List.”   Although the court overruled the convictions on other grounds, it133
affirmed the constitutionality of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the
predecessor statute to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).   Like the134
AECA, the Mutual Security Act of 1954 required licensure prior to exporting
items designated as part of a Munitions List.  After narrowing the construction
of some broad legislative and regulatory language, the Edler court held that:
As construed, [the statute] and the regulations do not interfere with constitutionally
protected speech.  Rather, they control the conduct of assisting foreign enterprises to
obtain military equipment and related technical expertise.  So confined, the statute and
regulations are not overbroad.  For the same reasons the licensing provisions of the Act
are not an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.135
The Edler court then considered the fact that some of the technical
information at issue was widely available within the public domain:
One additional First Amendment argument is presented.  This is that the Government
may not constitutionally prohibit the exportation of Edler’s technology because that
technology is widely distributed in the United States.  The District Court properly
rejected Edler’s position.  Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest
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in restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of public availability
in the United States is not a defense recognized by the Constitution.136
It is important to note that this public domain analysis was, in a sense,
superfluous, since no allegation in Edler was made that any of the technical
information at issue was classified.  Presumably, therefore, it had all
originated in the public domain.
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar situation in
United States v. Posey.   In Posey, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia,137
conspiring to transfer non-classified technical information to South Africa in
violation of the AECA.  The Ninth Circuit confirmed the conviction and
rejected the defendant’s argument that, because he had obtained the non-
classified information through a FOIA request, and because it was widely
available within the U.S., the Government could not regulate its export.  In
doing so, the Posey court relied upon Edler, in which, the court noted:
We held that the government’s power to issue such restrictions was not affected by the
domestic availability of the regulated data:  Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the
national interest in restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of
public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized by the Constitution.138
I should note that the information at issue in Posey was obtained from the
government through a FOIA request, but its ultimate origin may have been in
the public domain.  In any event, it was not classified information.139
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3.  Summary
In sum, then, the law most relevant to regulation of CDI currently allows
regulation of governmental secrets, to a point.  Once those secrets are out,
some courts have allowed the government to recapture the secret information
in some circumstances, though other courts, and individual judges, seem to
have questioned that practice.  Governmental regulation of information
originating in the public domain is also constitutional under the First
Amendment, at least in the limited arena of arms exports.
Unfortunately, federal statutes in this area are a patchwork.  While some
individual statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act, impose some regulatory
restrictions on some forms of CDI, no single, comprehensive federal statute
exists that addresses the dangers of CDI generally.
D.  A Reasonable Extension of the National Security Exception
The current state of the law is unacceptable.  Clearly, under Near and its
progeny, the federal government may constitutionally restrict access to
information that threatens national security.  Though various federal courts
have allowed regulation of such information when it has been released into,
or even originated in, the public domain, Congress has not adequately used its
constitutional authority to protect society against CDI.  It is therefore time for
Congress to enact reasonable restrictions upon possession and dissemination
of catastrophically dangerous information, even when that information
originates in the public domain.  Such restrictions can be implemented in a
way that is not only consistent with the First Amendment, but which also
incorporates adequate protections for other civil liberties.
This is evident from the rationale cited in Near and all of its progeny.
Each of these cases is based upon a concern for the national interests of the
United States.  But if it is in our national interest to restrict information on
troop deployments, or the identities of secret agents, or cryptographic
methodologies, it is far more in our interest to prevent destruction of one or
more of our major cities, or perhaps of the entire country.
On the other hand, we must give Howard Morland his due.  We must
recognize that restrictions on information in the public domain raise serious
civil liberties issues that must be addressed.  Fortunately, courts have already
developed mechanisms for restraining intrusive government actions, most
notably in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Congress, too, has addressed
similar issues in a different context by enacting the Foreign Intelligence
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Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),  which establishes federal tribunals140
designed to control government surveillance while still protecting government
secrets.
The FISA statute and the well-developed jurisprudence of the Fourth
Amendment both demonstrate that our legal system is capable of appropriately
balancing civil liberties with legitimate governmental regulatory needs.
Therefore, I propose a statutory solution to the problem presented by CDI.
Such a federal statute would prohibit possession of such information, whether
obtained from governmental sources or generated in the public domain, but,
borrowing from FISA, would also require a judicial warrant to be issued prior
to any seizure of such information, except in emergencies.  In those cases, a
brief exception for exigent circumstances would be provided, along with
expedited post-seizure judicial review.  In considering such a warrant request,
a federal court would consider a number of factors, including, first, the
inherent dangerousness of the information as measured by the extent of the
potential catastrophe the information could cause, as well as the probability
of the misuse of that information.  On the other side of the scale, the court
would consider legitimate technical uses of such information as well as the
possibility of reasonable restrictions on access to it.  Finally, the court would
evaluate the importance of that information to the political process, to ensure
that the electorate has the information necessary to making a reasoned
political judgment, but not enough information to destroy our entire political
system.
Ideally, such a federal statute would serve as a precursor to, and a model
for, an international treaty that would extend the protections of the statute
throughout the globe.  Such a treaty could be based upon, or even made an
adjunct to, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT), which created
what has been, at least until quite recently, a highly-effective international
regime designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.141
I realize that many people will take no comfort in these proposals.  They
will, much as the government ultimately did in the Progressive case, dismiss
as futile all efforts to control information in the public domain.  They will
make arguments about cats being out of bags, toothpaste out of the tube, and
genies out of the bottle, or, perhaps they will describe, as one of my relatives
is fond of doing, horses “that done left the barn.”  Whatever the metaphor, it
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all boils down to a futility argument.  Other people will lack confidence that
Congress and the courts are capable of drawing the proper balance between
the free exchange of ideas and information on the one hand, and international
security on the other.  Neither position is persuasive.
First, with regard to futility, I admit that no system for controlling CDI
will be perfect.  But perfection is not the standard.  Fortunately for all of us,
there are relatively few terrorists in the world, and our goal is to keep CDI
away from them, not necessarily from everyone.  Recall the Japanese code and
the Chicago Tribune:  At the end of the day, it did not matter that people in
Chicago knew that the code had been broken; it only mattered that the
Japanese did not.  Similarly, while it is not desirable for, say, some teenager
in Wichita to download a formula for nerve gas, his doing so ultimately does
no harm so long he leaves the formula unused on his hard drive.  We are
concerned only with people who will actually use CDI.
Can we keep CDI away from such people?  We can certainly try.  Armed
with appropriate statutory authority, we can shut down websites, or block
access to them.  New ones will spring up; we can block them as well.  We can
set up sting operations with fake CDI and pre-empt would-be attackers.  We
can, in other words, investigate people who visit websites containing CDI at
least as aggressively as we investigate people who download child
pornography.
We will be aided in our endeavors by the fact that the information we
seek to control is generally complex.  As the Al-Haramain court recognized,
even those who have seen a document once can benefit from seeing it again;
conversely, those who are denied the opportunity to keep and review
information lose much of that information’s value.   So, for example, if a142
terrorist organization gets its hands on workable blueprints for a nuclear
weapon, and the FBI manages to seize the information, the terrorist
organization will not be able to reconstruct the information from memory.  It
will have to go looking again, and may be thwarted the second time.  And
even if the terrorist organization manages to obtain nuclear blueprints a
second time, or a third, it is better done later, rather than sooner.
Any home security specialist will testify that, if a burglar wants to get into
a house, no alarm system will stop him.  Yet we buy alarm systems every day.
And while it may be true that no secret is ever really safe, we still try to
protect them.  Coca-Cola has safeguarded its secret formula for the past
century.  It is a safe bet that, if the secret formula were stolen, Coca Cola
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would seek an injunction forbidding its use or dissemination.  I propose that
we treat CDI at least as seriously as soda pop.
Finally, with regard to futility, I note that even Howard Morland believes
that restricting access to some types of information is necessary.  When a
reporter posed the question, “[i]s there anything today Morland would balk at
publishing?” Morland replied, “The thing that pops in my mind is if I knew
how to combine the lethality of the AIDS virus with the transmissibility of the
common cold, I would not tell anybody that.”   Morland did not explain why143
such information is more dangerous than nuclear weapons designs, nor how
protecting one type of information, but not the other, would be futile.144
With regard to those who fear that efforts to control CDI will lead to
establishment of a police state, I reply that a statute or a treaty such as I
propose, drawn up in the relatively calm environment of 2008, will be far
more protective of civil liberties in the long run than the constitutionally
comfortable alternative of doing nothing.  Consider, for example, the effect on
our civil liberties of a nuclear detonation in our nation’s capital.  A properly
placed fission weapon could simultaneously destroy the buildings housing all
three branches of the national government—the White House, the Capitol, and
the Supreme Court.  Such a detonation, or perhaps a second or third one, could
also destroy most executive agencies, including the Pentagon, in less than one
thousandth of one second.  If the parties responsible for this attack timed it
well, they would kill not only the President and the Vice President, but most
members of Congress, as well as all nine Justices of the Supreme Court.  The
heads of the various executive agencies and the armed forces would all be
killed as well, along with all of their senior staffs, except, of course, those who
happened to be traveling on the day in question.  Many of the records of these
agencies would be destroyed.
Within minutes of such an attack, one or more of the national television
networks would begin broadcasting pictures of the devastation.  The fear and
confusion our nation experienced on September 11, 2001, would pale in
comparison to the terror and uncertainty of such a moment:  Who did this
terrible thing?  How many died?  Who survived?  And even more importantly,
who is in charge now?  Within hours, that question would likely be answered
when some high-ranking military officer, perhaps with only the best of
intentions, appeared on television screens throughout the nation, declaring that
he was in charge, and that from that moment forward, martial law was in
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effect throughout the country.  Immediately, the search for additional
explosive devices would occur.  No warrants would be issued.  The FBI and
the military would begin quarantining foreign visitors, Muslims, and perhaps
Arab-Americans generally.  Political dissent would be forbidden.  So much for
civil liberties.  So much, perhaps, for the Constitution itself.
Benjamin Franklin once said that, “[t]hey that can give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”145
I note that Franklin narrowed the coverage of his maxim to only “essential”
liberty on the one hand, and “temporary” safety on the other.  But even if we
read Franklin’s aphorism as broadly as possible, we must remember that,
despite his extraordinary scientific vision, Franklin never foresaw the advent
of the hydrogen bomb.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Reasonable statutory and treaty restrictions upon the possession and
dissemination of catastrophically dangerous information—even when that
information is in the public domain—should be implemented, and can be
implemented in a way that is consistent with the First Amendment.
The national security exception to the First Amendment, embodied in
Near and its progeny, covers more than just military and other government
secrets.  It applies equally to catastrophically dangerous information, no
matter where it originated or how widely it has been disseminated.  Existing
Fourth Amendment protections, along with, ideally, statutory warrant
requirements, can adequately preserve our civil liberties.  Courts and
prosecutors should reject the notion that wide dissemination of information,
or even its generation in the public domain, somehow renders the government
powerless to restrict that information, because the danger posed by
catastrophically dangerous information becomes greater with dissemination,
rather than less.  The argument that it is futile to attempt to restrict such
information is a practical, not a legal, argument, and is, in either case,
fundamentally flawed.
The stakes could not be higher.  The renowned theoretical physicist
Stephen Hawking recently posted a question on the popular website
Yahoo.com:  “In a world that is in chaos politically, socially and
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environmentally, how can the human race sustain another 100 years?”146
Hawking’s question is profound, but, as we have seen, not particularly
original.  The question, and specifically its hundred-year horizon, echoes Carl
Sagan’s concerns about humanity’s “technological adolescence.”   Indeed,147
in a recorded commentary posted as a follow-up to his question,  Hawking148
makes an oblique reference to Fermi’s Paradox and suggests that perhaps in
another hundred years, colonization of other planets may increase our chances
of survival.  He also suggests that genetic engineering might make humanity
wiser and less aggressive enough to survive its own technological advances.
One can always hope.149
In the meantime, while they may state the issue in slightly different ways,
the consensus of those who know the most about the subject is clear:
humanity has entered a critical phase in its history, during which its survival
is very much an open question.  During the next few decades—if indeed, we
have that much time—humanity must take reasonable steps to control the
technology which threatens its existence.  Controlling access to
catastrophically dangerous information is an important, and constitutional,
element of such an effort.
